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A FALSE LIGHT IN THE DARKNESS:  PROTECTING 
CONSUMERS AND CREDITORS FROM THE DEBT 
SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
A debt settlement company is an entity that enters into a contract with 
someone who has unsecured debt, often for extremely large amounts that 
the person does not have the means to pay, to negotiate with creditors to 
settle the debt for a fraction of the amount originally owed.  As one can 
imagine, this industry has potential for abuse.  Unscrupulous debt 
settlement companies who prey on desperate people on the verge of 
bankruptcy often misrepresent what they can do for the consumer, front-
load their fees, and leave the consumer in a worse situation than before 
enrollment.  On August 10, 2010, the Federal Trade Commission published 
a new rule concerning debt settlement as part of its Telemarketing Sales 
Rule (TSR), prohibiting debt settlement companies from front-loading their 
fees, and strictly regulating how these companies may collect fees.  This 
rule will be inadequate to stop unscrupulous debt settlement companies 
from taking advantage of consumers, and a convoluted North Dakota statute 
does not reach these companies.  Recently, the North Dakota Legislature 
adopted H.B. 1038, which enacted a heavily modified version Uniform 
Debt Management Services Act in North Dakota.  This bill, if passed, will 
close the loopholes through which unscrupulous debt settlement companies 
can subvert the TSR and will afford consumers basic but vital protections 
against these companies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Eliminate your debt in as little as 12-36 months!”1  “Reduce your 
credit card debt by as much as 60%!”2  To many of us, these statements 
may seem like unrealistic claims,3 but to those deep in debt, these claims 
can be the only glimmer of light in absolute darkness.4  Their creditors are 
calling constantly, their debt balances are continually getting bigger, and 
they just want it all to stop and for life to go back to normal.5  In some 
cases, the companies that make these claims can actually help a person deep 
in debt settle that debt for much less than she owes.6  In many cases, 
though, this glimmer of light only leads the debtor further into the 
darkness.7 
The plausibility of the various claims debt settlement companies make 
is not the only problem.8  Front-loaded fee structures, instructions to stop 
making payments on debt, and various other abuses have not only forced 
debtors further into debt, but they also soak up the last assets creditors may 
have been able to claim in an eventual, and sometimes inevitable, bank-
ruptcy.9  These abuses have prompted both the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and the North Dakota Legislature to act.  The FTC acted to prevent 
abuse by amending the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) to ban many of the 
abusive practices.10  The new FTC regulations will not touch every corner 
of the market, though.11  Thus, the North Dakota Legislature is currently 
 
1. TIMELINE DEBT SOLUTIONS (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.timelinedebt.com.  Since 
publication of this article, this website no longer exists due to FTC regulations. 
2. Id. 
3. See generally Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,463 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to 
be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310), (detailing the abusive practices and claims in the debt settlement 
industry). 
4. See id. at 48,459 (stating “[d]ebt relief services have proliferated in recent years as the 
economy has declined and greater numbers of consumers hold debts they cannot pay”). 
5. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PUBLIC FORUM ON DEBT RELIEF AMENDMENTS TO THE 
TELEMARKETING SALES RULE 38 (2009), available at http://www ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/tsr-
debtrelief/transcript.pdf. 
6. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,471.  There is substantial debate on this 
point, with some commentators saying there is a substantial benefit to be had from a well-
regulated industry, and some saying there is no benefit at all.  Compare FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 5, at 39-40, with RICHARD BRIESCH, ECONOMIC FACTORS AND THE DEBT 
MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY 2-3 (Aug. 6, 2009), available at http://www.debtmanagementguys.com 
/debtmanagementarticles/briesch-whitepaper.pdf. 
7. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39. 
8. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,463. 
9. Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39. 
10. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2011). 
11. See infra Part III.C. 
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considering a heavily modified version of the Uniform Debt Management 
Services Act (UDMSA).12 
This article will argue the FTC regulation is a good start, but the new 
North Dakota Century Code chapter 13-11, enacted by House Bill 1038, 
will create a marketplace in North Dakota where honest debt settlement 
companies can do their work, and where dishonest debt settlement com-
panies will be punished harshly.13  Part II of this article will give an 
overview of the debt settlement industry and its abuses.14  Part III will detail 
the FTC’s amendment to the TSR, which bans many of the abuses of debt 
settlement companies when an interstate phone call is involved.15  Part IV 
will explore the current state of North Dakota law and the proposed version 
of the UDMSA.16  Part V will describe the impact of chapter 13-11 in North 
Dakota and will suggest some changes which will make the landscape safer 
for consumers and creditors to do their business.17 
II. THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
The debt settlement industry has greatly proliferated in the past few 
years as consumers have faced increasing financial difficulty.18  It is im-
portant to understand how the industry works and what the most common 
abusive practices are in order to understand how specific regulations affect 
the industry.19  First, this section will explore the existence and operation of 
the debt settlement industry.20  Next, this section will describe some of the 
more common abusive practices of the industry.21 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
At their core, debt settlement companies attempt to negotiate with 
creditors in order to lower the consumer’s principal amount owed, which 
the consumer will pay in one or a few payments.22  The theory behind this 
practice is that creditors will benefit from settling for smaller amounts 
 
12. 2011 N.D. Laws 428. 
13. See infra Part V.A. 
14. See infra Part II. 
15. See infra Part III. 
16. See infra Part VI. 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,458 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
19. Id. at 48,461. 
20. See infra Part II.A. 
21. See infra Part II.B. 
22. BRIESCH, supra note 6, at 12. 
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because it is more than they will get from other means of collecting.23  
Generally, if a debtor misses enough payments, a creditor will write off the 
debt and send it to a collection agency or law firm, or it will sell the debt.24  
These collection practices have rather low rates of recovery.25 
The creditor has several other options, as well, including filing a 
lawsuit.26  However, lawsuits cost money for both the creditor and the 
debtor, and creditors often may be better off through alternative means.27  
Eventually, the debtor may declare either Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy.28  Bankruptcy does not often lead to large recovery for creditors, 
though.29  Thus, debt settlement companies claim that creditors are willing 
to work with debtors in order to maximize their recovery.30 
The debt settlement program begins when the consumer contacts the 
company, and usually gives the company information about his or her debts 
and financial situation.31  The settlement company then purportedly 
evaluates the debtor’s financial situation and creates a payment plan by 
which the consumer amasses savings in an account for eventual settlements 
and pays the provider’s fee.32  The payments are usually made to a dedic-
ated bank account and are apportioned in various ways between savings for 
an eventual settlement and payment of the provider’s fees.33  Because the 
consumer is using all of his or her expendable income on making payments 
to this account, the consumer no longer makes any payments on his or her 
debt.34 
The provider then contacts the consumer’s creditors to solicit 
settlement offers.35  The company must generally wait several months to 
solicit offers, though, while the consumer amasses enough money in the 
dedicated account to actually pay a settlement offer.36  In the event that 
 
23. ABLE DEBT SETTLEMENT, INC, COMMENTS REGARDING TELEMARKETING SALES RULE 
20 (Oct. 2009), available at http://www ftc.gov/os/comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00181.pdf. 
24. BRIESCH, supra note 6, at 8. 
25. ABLE DEBT SETTLEMENT, supra note 23, at 20. 
26. BRIESCH, supra note 6, at 8-9. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 9. 
29. Id. 
30. ABLE DEBT SETTLEMENT, supra note 23, at 20. 
31. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,461 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 48,462 
36. Id. 
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creditors make an offer to settle, the settlement will be paid out of the 
dedicated account.37 
The fee structures of the various debt settlement companies vary sig-
nificantly.38  Some companies charge a large upfront fee, which has 
generally become known as a “front-loaded” fee.39  These fees can be a 
very large percentage of the total fees the provider will charge.40  An 
example of the fee structure can be found in the Minnesota Attorney 
General’s complaint against two providers.41  In one instance, a company 
named American Debt Settlement Solutions (ADSS) created a plan for a 
consumer who enrolled $17,595 of unsecured debt into its service.42  The 
plan called for a monthly payment of $328.48 for thirty-six months.43  For 
the first four months of the plan, every penny of the payment went to 
ADSS’s administrative and maintenance fees.44  For the next ten months, 
$202.96, over sixty percent of the payment, went to ADSS’s administrative 
and maintenance fees, with the remainder going into the consumer’s 
savings for settlements.45  For the final twenty months, the consumer only 
paid the fifty-nine dollar monthly maintenance fee.46  Therefore, the plan 
required almost thirty percent of the fees in the first four months and almost 
seventy-five percent of the fees in the first fourteen months.47 
Another provider, Debt RX USA (DRU), enrolled $43,158 of a 
consumer’s unsecured debt in a program with a similar fee structure.48  The 
consumer’s first four $494.52 monthly payments in a forty-eight month 
plan were to go entirely to the provider’s fees.49  Over the next twenty 
months, $224.78 of her payments would go to the provider’s fee.50  The last 
twenty-four payments would go entirely to the consumer’s savings.51  
Under the plan, the client would pay almost one-third of the total fee of 
 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF MINN., COMMENT REGARDING TELEMARKETING 
SALES RULE—DEBT RELIEF AMENDMENTS 2 (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www ftc.gov/os/ 
comments/tsrdebtrelief/543670-00330.pdf. 
42. Id. at 5-6. 
43. Id. at 6. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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$6473.70 in the first four months, and the entire fee in the first half of the 
plan.52 
B. CONSUMER PROTECTION CONCERNS 
There are two major categories of consumer protection concerns 
regarding debt settlement companies.53  The first concerns the repre-
sentations and disclosures the companies make to the consumer, and the 
second concerns the front-loading of fees.54  As the FTC has noted, there 
are several common false, misleading, or unsubstantiated representations 
that debt settlement providers make to consumers, which raise serious con-
sumer protection concerns.55  Most notable, and most common, are the 
claims of how much debt can be settled for and how much time the 
settlement will take.56  Many consumers are lured into debt settlement by 
claims that the provider will or is highly likely to obtain large debt reduc-
tions for its enrollees.57 
It does not take much effort to find claims of large settlement 
possibilities on the websites of various debt settlement providers.58  Fast 
Debt Settlements claims on its website that a consumer can reduce his or 
her debt by “as much as 40% to 60% of the total balance.”59  Fast Debt also 
claims the reduction can be done with a “low monthly payment.”60  Fast 
Track Debt Relief shows in a bar graph that you could settle $30,000 of 
debt for $16,000 to $20,000.61  This thirty-five to forty-five percent figure 
may not seem like too outrageous of a claim, but on the same page, Fast 
Track shows a graph of its “Top Settlements.”62  Every single one of those 
 
52. Id. 
53. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,463 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. A Google search done on February 6, 2010 using the term “debt settlement” returned two 
companies making these claims as the first two “sponsored listings” for the search.  It should be 
noted that because claims of large, untypical settlements are now illegal, the websites have largely 
removed the claims that they can reduce your debts by shockingly large amounts. 
59. FAST DEBT SETTLEMENTS, http://www fastdebtsettlements.com (last visited Feb. 6, 
2010). 
60. Id. 
61. FAST TRACK DEBT RELIEF, http://fasttrackdebtrelief.com/debt-settlement-lp.aspx?utm_ 
source=google&utm_medium=cpc&utm_term=debt+settlement&m=PPC&gclid=CNz7vsTx86Y
CFQjrKgodswnWDQ (last visited Feb. 6, 2010) (accessed as a Google link page).  This is a 
different page than Fast Track’s home page, but arguably would have more traffic due to its 
presence on Google. 
62. Id. 
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settlements reduced the debt by more than seventy-five percent,63 repre-
senting to the consumer that this is a common or typical result.  The only 
disclaimer for these figures is the “individual results may vary,” which 
never warns the consumer that these results are nowhere near typical.64 
In fact, the settlement figures are severely compromised by the low 
program completion rates debt settlement companies maintain.65  In their 
disclaimers, both Fast Track and Fast Debt note the settlement results are 
contingent on the completion of their program.66  While most providers 
declined to give the FTC completion rates of their clients despite repeated 
requests, The Association of Settlement Companies (TASC), an organi-
zation that represents debt settlement providers, responded with the results 
of a survey of its members.67  The survey showed that after three years, 
only 24.6% of debt settlement clients had completed programs, while only 
9.6% were still enrolled.68  These results indicate almost two-thirds of debt 
settlement consumers did not complete the program.69 
The TASC survey also had some serious problems.70  Only twelve 
companies responded with “sufficient data to determine a three-year 
dropout rate.”71  In addition, “completion” was defined as having settled at 
least seventy-five percent of the consumer’s overall debt amount.72  In a 
survey of 4500 consumers, Dr. Richard Briesch found the cancellation rate 
was sixty percent over two years.73  Thus, the odds that a consumer will 
settle his or her debt for anywhere near what these companies claim are 
very low. 
Despite the fact that those who drop out of the programs will almost 
certainly not achieve the promised results, settlement companies claim the 
consumers still benefit because most of them settle at least one account 
before dropping out of the program.74  The TASC survey shows only about 
thirty-five percent of those who dropped out received any settlement at 
all.75  Therefore, approximately forty-two percent of all consumers who 
 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,471 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
66. FAST DEBT SETTLEMENTS, supra note 59; FAST TRACK DEBT RELIEF, supra note 61. 
67. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48471. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. BRIESCH, supra note 6, at 2. 
74. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,473. 
75. Id. 
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enrolled have received no settlements at all.76  In addition, it was reported 
the dropouts received $58.1 million in savings from settlement, but they 
also paid $55.6 million in fees.77  These extra fees wipe out almost any 
benefit the consumer might have seen.78  Moreover, the debt settlement 
statistics do not include any data on how much the rest of the consumer’s 
unsecured debt increased due to late fees, interest, etc. from the consumer’s 
nonpayment.79 
There are several other problems with the claims about specific savings 
that debt settlement companies make.80  The FTC found debt settlement 
companies were exceedingly ready to twist the average savings achieved by 
consumers.81  Two of the most common distortions of the numbers regard 
interest and fees from creditors, and fees from the provider.82  Fees and 
interest add to the principal of the debt.83  The providers take their statistics 
from the amount settled compared to the amount of the principal at the time 
of the settlement.84  Thus, while the settlement may be fifty percent of the 
principal at the time of the settlement, it may only be thirty to forty percent 
of the original principal enrolled.85  In addition, claims of savings would all 
be calculated without adding in fees from the provider themselves, further 
reducing the percentage of savings.86  Finally, there is no guarantee all 
debts will be settled.87  Some creditors may not be willing to work with the 
settlement company, or the consumer may not have enough money to meet 
some settlement offers.88  Meanwhile, the principal on the debts continue to 
increase due to interest and fees.89  Thus, rather than reducing his or her 
debt, the consumer has actually acquired more debt.90 
A closely related pair of abusive practices are also common in the debt 
settlement industry:  the promise that calls and lawsuits from creditors will 
cease and the failure to disclose how ceasing to pay creditors will affect the 
 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 48,474. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 48,475. 
88. Id. at 48,463. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
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consumer.91  What is abusive about claiming calls and lawsuits will cease is 
not only the claim itself, but how the companies achieve fruition of the 
claim.92  Many debt settlement companies instruct consumers to assign 
them power of attorney or to change their addresses and phone numbers on 
file with the creditors to the provider’s address and phone number.93  As a 
result, any calls, letters, or complaints would be delivered to the provider 
rather than the consumer.94  Alternatively, many debt settlement companies 
simply tell the consumer not to talk to his or her creditors and to direct all 
creditors to the debt settlement provider.95 
Additionally, as noted, many debt settlement providers instruct con-
sumers to cease making payments on their debts.96  Thus, while the 
consumer becomes delinquent on his or her debts, creditors direct notices of 
the consumer’s delinquency and the charges associated with delinquency to 
the provider.97  Meanwhile, the consumer does not realize non-payment will 
affect his or her credit score and will actually increase the principals of the 
consumer’s debts.98  Some providers, such as Able Debt Settlement, suggest 
implicitly that debt settlement will improve a consumer’s credit score.99  
Fast Debt Settlement gives the explanation that, essentially, if a consumer 
has a good credit score before entering debt settlement, the score will be 
“destroyed,” but if the consumer has a really bad score, debt settlement may 
actually improve the consumer’s score.100 
Finally, what many call “front-loading” fees is a common practice in 
the industry.101  Because the fees go to the provider, rather than the 
consumer’s savings, the consumer will take longer to accumulate enough 
savings to pay any settlement offers that may have come from the 
program.102  Therefore, in the first few months of the program, the provider 
literally cannot provide any benefit to the consumer.103  Take, for instance, 
 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 48,482. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 48,461. 
97. Id. at 48,462. 
98. Id. at 48,463. 
99. Frequently Asked Questions, ABLE DEBT SETTLEMENT, http://www.abledebtsettlement. 
com/faq htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
100. Frequently Asked Questions About Debt Collection & Debt Settlements, FAST DEBT 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www fastdebtsettlements.com/FrequentlyAskedDebtSettlementQuestions 
andPractices html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
101. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,463. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 48,473. 
          
2011] NOTE 283 
the earlier example from Minnesota.104  One particular consumer owed over 
$40,000, and her payments to the debts settlement company were $494.52 
per month.105  Her first four payments, almost $2000, went entirely to the 
provider’s fee.106  It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which the consumer 
could have settled at least one of her debts in that four month period if the 
statistics for settlements these providers give are accurate.  Instead, all of 
that money went to the provider, and the consumer and her creditors had 
less to resolve their issues with.107 
An even larger problem with the front-loaded fee model is that it 
encourages providers to “take all comers” without making an honest effort 
to evaluate which consumers are appropriate for a provider’s plan.108  
Johnson Tyler, an attorney at Southern Brooklyn Legal Services, testified 
about a client whose only income was $700 a month from SSI and had 
$30,000 in credit card debt.109  The client enrolled in a debt settlement 
program even though she obviously had no possibility of receiving 
settlements.110 
Much of the debt settlement industry strongly believes advance fees are 
necessary for the capitalization of their business.111  The providers claim 
they provide valuable services in the first few months, what some of the 
industry leaders described as “hand-holding.”112  This implicitly implies 
settlement providers believe they cannot survive if they are required to 
subsist wholly on a fee after a settlement is made.113  However, considering 
the fact that eighty-four percent of debt settlement companies surveyed by 
the United States Organization for Bankruptcy Alternatives (USOBA) 
about the effect of a ban on advance fees believed that they would most 
likely have to close their doors, there is reason to question whether the 
profits these companies make from the people who drop out after a few 
months are the key to their successful operation.114 
 
104. See supra Part II.A. 
105. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF MINN., supra note 41, at 6. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39-40. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,477 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified 
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
112. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 38. 
113. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,477. 
114. Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39-40. 
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III. AMENDMENT TO THE TELEMARKETING SALES RULE 
An amendment FTC’s TSR took effect on October 27, 2010.115  The 
TSR acts to significantly bolster regulation of some of the most abusive 
practices of the debt settlement industry.116  Part A of this section will detail 
the advance fee ban promulgated by the regulation.117  Part B will describe 
the disclosures debt settlement providers must make to their consumers, as 
well as the prevention of certain common misrepresentations.118  Finally, 
Part C will discuss the limitation of the regulation, particularly in its 
scope.119 
A. ADVANCE FEE BAN 
The FTC, after much comment from industry, government, and non-
profit interests, decided to include in its amendment of the TSR a ban on the 
most destructive practice of the debt settlement industry:  front-loading 
fees.120  This is an outright ban.121  The final rule “[p]rohibits providers 
from charging or collecting fees until they have provided the debt relief 
services.”122  Two preliminary conditions must be met before the fee can be 
charged, and in addition, the fee structure must comply with the TSR’s 
specifications.123 
The regulation first requires the consumer “execute a debt relief agree-
ment with the creditor.”124  According to the text of the regulation, fees may 
not be charged until “[t]he seller or telemarketer has renegotiated, settled, 
reduced, or otherwise altered the terms of at least one debt pursuant to a 
settlement agreement, debt management plan, or other such valid con-
tractual agreement executed by the customer.”125  In other words, “hand-
holding” is no longer a valid reason to charge fees.126  The consumer must 
achieve some amount of success with the program before any fees can be 
charged.127  A creditor must have agreed to settle.128 
 
115. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,491. 
116. Id. at 48,469, 48,491. 
117. See infra Part III.A. 
118. See infra Part III.B. 
119. See infra Part III.C. 
120. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,465. 
121. See id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i)(A) (2011). 
126. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 5, at 39-40 (stating “hand-holding” is 
not what debt settlement consumers need). 
127. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,465. 
          
2011] NOTE 285 
Secondly, “the consumer must make at least one payment pursuant to 
that agreement.”129  Thus, the consumer must not only sign a settlement 
agreement with the creditor, he or she must begin to perform that agree-
ment.130  The agreement will foreclose any chance debt settlement com-
panies will attempt to rush the consumer into signing agreements that the 
consumer cannot perform, thus allowing the provider to collect a fee.131 
Finally, the structure of the fees must also comply with certain 
requirements.132  If a provider were allowed to charge its fees in any 
structure it wanted, the purpose of the advance fee ban could be circum-
vented because companies could charge all of the fees after the first settle-
ment or could begin a fee structure similar to the current front-loaded 
structures after the first settlement.133 
There are two basic fee structures the TSR will now allow:  a pro-
portional flat-fee structure or a percentage structure based on the amount 
saved.134  First, a per-settlement flat fee may be collected as a proportional 
relationship to the total fee charged and the amount of the debt enrolled.135  
In other words, the fee for a single settlement must be in the same pro-
portion to the total fee as the proportion of the settled debt to the total debt 
enrolled.136  For instance, consider a hypothetical in which a consumer 
enrolls $10,000 in debt for which the provider will charge a total fee of 
$1000.  If the provider settles twenty-five percent of the debt, or $2500, the 
provider may only collect twenty-five percent of the fee, or $250.  This pro-
portional fee requirement will allow a flat-fee model, but will prevent 
providers from loading all or a large part of the fee on the first settlement.137 
Alternatively, providers may charge a percentage of the savings a 
consumer realizes from each settlement.138  This percentage must be the 
same for every settlement throughout the contract.139  Thus, providers will 
not be able to front-load fees by charging large percentages for the first 
settlement and small percentages for the later settlements.140  The FTC 
 
128. Id. 
129. Id.;  see also 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i)(B). 
130. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,465. 
131. Id. at 48,489. 
132. Id. at 48,490. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i)(C)(1) (2011). 
136. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,490. 
137. Id. 
138. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i)(C)(2). 
139. Id. 
140. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,490 & n.436. 
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expressly refrained from limiting the amount of fees providers can charge, 
stating “fee-setting is best done by a competitive market.”141 
B. DISCLOSURES AND MISREPRESENTATIONS 
Debt settlement telemarketing is particularly ripe for deception because 
many times consumers do not know how debt settlement works.142  
Pursuant to the amended TSR, debt settlement providers are required to 
make four separate new types of disclosures.143  These disclosures are 
intended to ensure consumers have the basic information necessary to 
determine whether debt settlement will meet their needs and to ensure 
consumers understand how debt settlement works.144  The provider must 
make these disclosures before the consumer enrolls in the debt settlement 
program.145 
The first new required disclosure is timing.146  The provider must 
inform the consumer how long it will take to see the results the provider 
promised.147  Additionally, the provider must disclose how long it will be 
until the provider will begin making settlement offers to the consumer’s 
creditors.148  A second, but related, disclosure is the amount of money the 
consumer must accumulate before the provider can make a bona fide settle-
ment offer to the consumer’s creditors.149  These disclosures will help to 
ensure “consumers understand the time and monetary commitment 
necessary for the plan to succeed.”150  For instance, both of the consumers 
in the previous examples from Minnesota did not realize that settlement 
activity would not occur immediately.151  The new disclosure requirement 
will prevent this misunderstanding.152 
The third required disclosure concerns the effect of debt settlement on 
the consumer’s financial well-being.153  This disclosure is required if the 
debt settlement program entails the consumer failing to make timely 
payments to his or her creditors.154  The provider must inform the consumer 
 
141. Id. at 48,488. 
142. Id. at 48,492. 
143. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(viii). 
144. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,492. 
145. Id. at 48,496. 
146. Id. at 48,492. 
147. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(viii)(A). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. § 310.3(a)(1)(viii)(B). 
150. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,492. 
151. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF MINN., supra note 41, at 6; see supra Part II.A. 
152. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,492. 
153. Id. at 48,493. 
154. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(viii)(C). 
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of the effect non-payment may have on his or her credit score, that it may 
result in collection action or lawsuits by creditors, and that non-payment 
may increase the consumer’s principal balance due to fees and interest.155  
Many debt settlement providers tell their clients to cease paying their 
creditors and dedicate those funds to saving for settlements.156  Ceasing to 
pay creditors will, rather obviously, lead to a serious negative impact on the 
consumer’s financial well-being.157  Many consumers do not understand 
that enrolling in a debt settlement program does not protect them from these 
problems.158 
The final new disclosure required by the TSR regards companies who 
request or require the consumer deposit funds into a dedicated account.159  
The provider must ensure the consumer knows he or she has the right to 
withdraw all of the funds currently in the account with no penalty.160  Thus, 
if a consumer has a major unexpected bill that absolutely must be paid or 
decides to leave the program, the consumer knows that he or she will not 
lose the money already saved.161 
There are three general disclosures every service regulated by the TSR 
must comply with.162  The first is the disclosure of the total cost of the 
services the provider will render.163  The notice of the final rule noted that 
many times what providers represent about the costs of the program is 
different from what the contract price is.164  The total cost disclosure would 
eliminate those false representations.165  Secondly, providers must disclose 
any “material restrictions, limitations, or conditions” that apply to the 
service.166  Particularly, the FTC pointed to any minimum debt level restric-
tions a provider might have and whether the service is restricted to 
unsecured debt.167  Finally, the seller must disclose if it does not allow 
refunds, cancellations, exchanges, or repurchases.168  If the seller makes any 
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156. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,493. 
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159. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(viii)(D). 
160. Id. 
161. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,494. 
162. Id. at 48,495. 
163. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(i). 
164. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,495. 
165. Id. 
166. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(ii). 
167. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,496. 
168. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(iii). 
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representations about refunds, it must disclose the material terms of its 
refund policy to the consumer.169 
The amendment to the TSR also prohibits misrepresentations about 
“[a]ny material aspect of any debt relief service.”170  Included in this rule, 
and stated as examples, are the most common misrepresentations:  how 
much savings the consumer can achieve and how long the plan will take.171  
Essentially, the amendment to the TSR requires providers not misrepresent 
the information they are required to provide in their disclosures.172  
Additionally, a provider cannot represent itself as a non-profit agency if it is 
not, in fact, a non-profit agency.173 
C. LIMITATIONS 
Because the TSR is, as the name implies, limited in its scope, it is 
important to discuss to what transactions the TSR will apply.174  First, non-
profit entities are exempted from the FTC regulation and, therefore, are not 
subject to the TSR.175  However, the FTC notes non-profits must comply 
with strict laws from the IRS, as well as laws from forty-nine states.176 
The TSR applies to all telemarketing activity, which is defined as “a 
plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the purchase of 
goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or more tele-
phones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call.”177  
There are several exemptions from this definition.178  Specifically, the TSR 
exempts inbound phone calls in response to general advertisement.179 
In the case of debt relief services, though, the TSR specifically includes 
inbound calls in response to general advertisements.180  Thus, debt relief 
services are within the jurisdiction of the TSR if the providers conduct the 
more traditional outbound interstate telemarketing activity, or if the 
providers receive an inbound interstate call in response to an advertising 
medium.181  As the FTC notes, in their current forms, the broad inclusion of 
 
169. Id. 
170. Id. § 310.3(a)(2)(x). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,458. 
175. Id. at 48,466. 
176. Id. 
177. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(dd). 
178. Id. § 310.6(b). 
179. Id. § 310.6(b)(5)-(6). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
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telemarketing calls will most likely cover all known for-profit debt relief 
agencies.182 
There are other exemptions, though, that will allow unscrupulous debt 
settlement companies to avoid these rules, if they so desire.183  The FTC 
notes attorneys will, for the most part, not be covered by the regulation 
because of the “face-to-face” exemption.184  This exemption provides that 
the TSR does not apply if the transaction is not completed or payment is not 
required until after a face-to-face meeting with the provider.185  At least one 
provider employs an “independent contractor” method of operation.186  In 
order to be exempt, all a provider would need to do is have independent 
contractors in the state in which it wishes to operate and require clients sign 
their contracts in the presence of the independent contractor. 
In addition, because the TSR requires an interstate phone call, the 
provider may not even need to have the independent contractor meet the 
client in person.187  The provider could, in their advertisements, provide 
consumers with intrastate phone numbers that connect the client to inde-
pendent contractors, which would also circumvent the jurisdiction of the 
TSR.  A provider could also attempt to operate all of its initial communi-
cations with consumers over the Internet in order to circumvent the TSR’s 
jurisdiction.  Because so many of these businesses believe the new regu-
lations will put them out of business,188 it is likely that at least some will 
attempt to get around them. 
Finally, the TSR includes a broad definition of “debt relief services.”189  
The definition includes any service that “represent[s], directly or by impli-
cation, to renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter the terms of payment or 
other terms of the debt between a person and one or more unsecured 
creditors or debt collectors.”190  The definition works to include not only 
debt settlement, but also credit counseling and debt negotiation.191 
 
182. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,403 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified 
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) (stating each of the approximately 2000 entities which sell debt relief 
services engages in telemarketing as defined by the TSR). 
183. 16 C.F.R. § 310.6(b)(3). 
184. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,468. 
185. 16 C.F.R. § 310.6(b)(3). 
186. ABLE DEBT SETTLEMENT, supra note 23, at 17. 
187. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(dd). 
188. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,477. 
189. Id. at 48,466. 
190. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(m). 
191. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 48,466. 
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IV. THE UNIFORM DEBT MANAGEMENT SERVICES ACT 
In the sixty-second legislative session, a version of the UDMSA was 
signed into law in North Dakota in order to regulate debt settlement 
companies.  This section will discuss the major provisions of the law and 
will compare it to versions passed in other states.  This section will first 
briefly discuss the former state of the law in North Dakota.192  Next, it will 
consider the registration requirements within the UDMSA, followed by the 
UDMSA’s treatment of fees and disclosures.193  Finally, this section will 
discuss the enforcement provisions of the UDMSA.194 
A. FORMER NORTH DAKOTA LAW:  CHAPTER 13-06 
The former North Dakota law relating to the practice of “debt 
adjusting” was codified in North Dakota Century Code section 13-06-01.  
The statute provided that: 
“Debt adjusting” means the making of a contract, express or 
implied, with a debtor whereby the debtor agrees to pay a certain 
amount of money or other thing of value periodically to the person 
engaged in the debt adjusting business who shall, for a 
consideration, distribute the same among certain specified 
creditors in accordance with a plan agreed upon.  The term 
includes a debt adjustment, budget counseling, debt management, 
or debt pooling service or the holding of oneself out, by words of 
similar import, as providing services to debtors in the management 
of their debts and contracting with the debtor for a fee to: 
a. Effect the adjustment, compromise, or discharge of any 
account, note, or other indebtedness, of the debtor; or 
b. Receive from the debtor and disburse to the debtor’s 
creditors any money or other thing of value.195 
The next section, 13-06-02, made the practice of “debt adjusting” a 
class A misdemeanor.196  The definition of “debt adjusting” was at best 
internally inconsistent.197  The first sentence of the statute seemed to 
suggest only companies that distribute funds to creditors are included in the 
definition.198  The second sentence seemed to suggest either distributing 
 
192. See infra Part IV.A. 
193. See infra Parts IV.B-C. 
194. See infra Part IV.D. 
195. N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-06-01 (2009) (repealed 2011). 
196. Id. § 13-06-02. 
197. In re Kendall, 440 B.R. 526, 531 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2010). 
198. Id. 
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funds to creditors or attempting to “[e]ffect the adjustment, compromise, or 
discharge” will bring a provider under the statute.199 
Upon examination of similar statutes in other states, it is clear section 
13-06-01 is actually a combination of two distinct statutes.  For instance, 
Florida Statute section 559:10 is identical to the first sentence of the North 
Dakota statutes.200  On the other hand, Ohio Revised Statutes section 
4710.01 is identical to the second sentence of the North Dakota statute.201  
Thus, it is unclear just what the North Dakota Legislature intended to 
regulate with section 13-06-01. 
Section 13-06-01 does not prohibit debt settlement in the State of North 
Dakota.  While the FTC thought otherwise,202 the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of North Dakota interpreted the North Dakota statute to require the 
provider to collect and distribute funds to run afoul of this law.203  Most 
debt settlement companies no longer work this way, preferring to have the 
consumer control and distribute the funds.204  Section 13-06-01 is outdated, 
as the legislature has no doubt acknowledged and has therefore changed. 
B. REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS 
North Dakota Century Code section 13-11-02 now requires, as a first 
step, that all debt settlement providers have a license.205  Application for the 
license is made to the Commissioner of the Department of Financial 
Institutions, which has regulatory power over the companies.206  The new 
law does away with the antiquated definition of “debt adjusting” and offers 
a new definition for “debt-settlement service.”207  The new definition 
includes services whose primary purpose is to advise or help consumers 
settle their debt for less than the original principal, as well as services that 
advise or help consumers accumulate funds in order to settle their debts.208  
The bill exempts attorneys, accountants, family financial planners, and non-
profit credit counseling agencies.209 
 
199. Id. 
200. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 559:10 (West Supp. 2011). 
201. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4710.01 (West Supp. 2011). 
202. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 48,458, 48,464 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified 
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310). 
203. In re Kendall, 2010 WL 2787631, at *6 (Bankr. D.N.D. 2010).  The North Dakota 
Supreme Court has never ruled on the issue. 
204. See generally id. at *2. 
205. N.D. CENT. CODE § 13-11-02 (Supp. 2011). 
206. Id. §§ 13-11-01(2), -03. 
207. Id. § 13-11-01(6). 
208. Id. 
209. Id. § 13-11-01(6)(a)-(h). 
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In addition to the license application and applicable fees, debt settle-
ment companies seeking to do business with North Dakota consumers must 
post a $50,000 surety bond, presumably to cover any costs that might arise 
from potential abuse by that company.210  Also, the bill requires that the 
managers and owners of the companies have never been convicted of a 
felony or misdemeanor in order to get a license.211  The license may be 
revoked at any point the provider does not pay its annual fee or does not 
comply with any section of the statute.212  These are fairly liberal require-
ments in comparison to the Colorado version of the UDMSA.213  Colorado 
requires evidence of a $1,000,000 insurance policy and that the proprietors, 
as well as all of their debt specialists, be certified by an independent 
agency.214 
C. FEES, DISCLOSURES, AND OTHER RESTRICTIONS 
The North Dakota Legislature has chosen to deal with advance fees 
directly and in a way similar to that of the TSR.215  Subsection 13-11-21(2) 
outright bans any type of upfront or setup fees.216  A provider is only 
allowed to collect fees from a consumer if (1) the consumer has entered into 
an agreement with the creditor to settle a debt and (2) the funds for the 
settlement are provided to the creditor.217  After these conditions are met, 
the provider can then collect a fee, but only in an amount, which is less than 
thirty percent of the total savings the consumer has realized from the settle-
ment.218  Thus, if a $2000 debt is settled for $1000, resulting in a savings of 
$1000, the provider can only collect a fee of $300.219  In addition, a 
provider cannot settle any of the consumer’s debts for more than fifty 
percent of the principal without the consumer’s consent, thus eradicating 
any possibility the provider might settle as many debts as quickly as 
possible in order to collect fees.220  The consumer must see real, tangible 
results before the provider can take a fee. 
 
210. Id. § 13-11-04. 
211. Id. § 13-11-05(1)(b). 
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In addition, there are several disclosures the provider must make to the 
consumer before they can enter into a contract.221  The disclosures are 
almost identical to the ones the TSR now requires, except for a few 
additions.222  The provider must disclose that debt settlement services are 
not appropriate for all consumers and that debt settlement may harm the 
consumer’s ability to obtain credit.223  The provider must also inform the 
consumer they are still obligated to pay their bills while enrolled and some 
of their creditors may not be willing to settle.224  The consumer must also be 
informed that they should look into both non-profit credit counseling and 
bankruptcy.225  Furthermore, the provider must disclose how long the 
program will take, as well as how much savings must be accumulated for 
the provider to be able to make offers to each of the consumer’s 
creditors.226  Finally, the provider must perform and disclose to the 
consumer an individualized financial analysis, which determines the 
consumer can in good faith complete the program and includes the savings 
goals and the amount of fees the provider will collect.227  These disclosures 
should all work together to provide the consumer with enough information 
to make an informed decision. 
There are several restrictions that will seriously restrain the debt 
settlement industry, as well.  First, as mentioned previously, the provider 
cannot make settlements without the consumer’s consent for more than fifty 
percent of the original principal.228  The provider cannot take “a power of 
attorney that authorizes the provider to settle a debt.”229  Finally, and most 
restrictively, providers cannot structure a plan that would result in the 
negative amortization of the consumer’s debt.230  The provision essentially 
means a provider cannot structure a plan that will require the consumer 
cease paying his or her debts because the non-payment would allow the 
interest to become part of the principal.231  As many of the companies tell 
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their consumers, these plans may not work unless the consumer ceases to 
pay his or her bills.232 
D. ENFORCEMENT 
There are three major enforcement mechanisms present in this bill.  
First, violation of any provision of the chapter is a class C felony.233  Thus, 
if a provider or any of its employees violate the restrictions in the provision, 
they can be charged with a crime.234  Secondly, the Commissioner of the 
Department of Financial Institutions, as well as the Attorney General, have 
the power to impose a $5000 civil penalty on the provider for any willful 
violation of the chapter.235 
Finally, and most importantly, the statute creates a private right of 
action for any consumer who is harmed by a violation of the chapter.236  If 
the consumer wins, the provider can be forced to pay the consumer’s 
damages or $2000, whichever is greater.237  In addition, if the consumer 
wins, the court can award costs, fees, and attorney’s fees to the consumer as 
the prevailing party.238  The private right of action is important for two 
reasons.  First, it gives the consumer the obvious right to redress their 
grievance with the provider.239  Additionally, because many of these 
consumers eventually end up in bankruptcy, the action could allow the 
bankruptcy trustee or the creditors of the consumer to recover some funds 
from the provider for the benefit of the bankruptcy estate.240  Thus, the 
private right of action not only will help consumers protect themselves, it 
will also allow creditors to recover more in bankruptcy. 
V. IMPACT 
Chapter 13-11 will have an immediate and important impact on 
consumers and providers in the debt settlement industry.  This section will 
first show the positive impact the new regulations, in conjunction with the 
TSR, will have for consumers and the State of North Dakota, and will urge 
 
232. See Transcript of Undercover GAO Calls to Debt Settlement Companies, U.S. SENATE 
COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, & TRANSP., http://commerce.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve 
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the legislature to pass the bill.241  This section will also suggest a few 
important changes that should be made to the bill in order to strengthen its 
impact.242 
A. IMPACT ON THE DEBT SETTLEMENT INDUSTRY 
Chapter 13-11 and the TSR will work together to ensure enforcement 
of fee regulations and disclosure requirements in order to protect consumers 
from unscrupulous debt settlement companies.  First and foremost, chapter 
13-11 will close the loopholes through which providers could circumvent 
TSR regulation in North Dakota.243  The TSR, as mentioned earlier, is 
limited by interstate phone calls, for-profit statutes, and the face-to-face 
exemption.244  Without regulation directly in the State of North Dakota, 
settlement companies could and probably will try to circumvent the TSR.245  
Chapter 13-11 does not have any of those limitations.246  It simply regulates 
those entities that engage in the business of debt settlement with a consumer 
who resides in North Dakota.247 
Some commentators have theorized the UDMSA, in the states where it 
is enacted, will actually act to completely exclude the industry from that 
state.248  Additionally, as demonstrated previously, many of the providers in 
the industry believe the TSR amendments will completely destroy the 
industry.249  However, if debt settlement providers cannot maintain their 
businesses in an ethical and trustworthy way, the value of accommodating 
the industry is outweighed by the risk it poses to consumers.250 
Some commentators have also suggested the consumers who would be 
able to complete debt settlement programs would also be able to complete 
credit counseling plans, which renegotiate the terms and interest rates of the 
debts to lower payments, rather than attempting to achieve lump sum settle-
ments for less than the original principal.251  Before declaring bankruptcy, 
debtors must already attempt to go through credit counseling with an 
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agency approved by the U.S. Trustee.252  Additionally, a consumer may 
have the option to declare Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, which lowers payments 
by using the power of the court to force creditors to lower their principals 
and agree to a plan that allows the debtor to pay off his or her creditors over 
time.253  Thus, if the debt settlement industry is destroyed, consumers still 
have options to resolve their debt issues. 
The North Dakota Legislature has done exactly what was necessary to 
protect consumers and creditors by enacting chapter 13-11.  This measure 
will help protect some of our most vulnerable citizens:  those who have 
incurred too much debt and are desperate to get out from under the weight 
of it.  In addition, it will help protect creditors from debt settlement com-
panies who would take what is left of the debtor’s assets in fees and, 
therefore, inhibit the debtor’s ability to pay his or her creditors.  Overall, 
this bill is necessary to ensure the continual and complete regulation of the 
debt settlement industry. 
B. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO CHAPTER 13-11 
Two important changes should be made to chapter 13-11 in order to 
strengthen its consumer protection goals.  First, the legislature should 
strengthen its enforcement mechanism by allowing consumers to collect 
treble damages for violations of the provision, which will act as a preven-
tative measure.  Providers in the state will avoid breaking the rules at all 
costs due to the dire consequences of civil enforcement of the law. 
In addition, similar to the Colorado UDMSA, chapter 13-11 should 
require independent accreditation for all employees who sell or provide the 
services,254 which will alleviate the “say anything to get the sale” approach 
that many debt settlement advertising and telemarketing campaigns use.  It 
will ensure the people who are making representations about what they can 
do for a consumer actually know something about debt settlement and have 
a reasonable basis for their claims.  It will also help ensure better screening 
of potential clients because agents of the company will have a better under-
standing of whom their service can help. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Debt settlement is an industry that is ripe with abusive practices and 
unscrupulous companies.255  It is possible, though, that debt settlement can 
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provide value to consumers in an ethical and honest fashion.256  Because 
consumers who are deep in debt are very vulnerable to the deceptive 
practices of these providers, this industry must be surrounded by careful 
regulation.257  The amendment to the FTC’s TSR that bans advance fees 
and requires certain disclosures will help to curtail the abuses of this 
industry.258  This rule has jurisdiction limitations, though, and the North 
Dakota Legislature has stepped in to fill the void.259  North Dakota Century 
Code chapter 13-11, which will regulate the debt settlement industry in 
North Dakota, is a giant leap forward for vulnerable debtors and 
creditors.260  While the statute can be strengthened, its passage will 
ultimately ensure the end of some of the most abusive and deceptive 
practices promulgated by the debt settlement industry.261  No longer will 
debt settlement companies be allowed to offer a false light in the darkness. 
Jonathan L. Voigt* 
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